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FEA TURE ARTICLES
Enforcement Practices for Breaches of
Consumer Protection Legislation
By Michael Faure,* Anthony Ogus** & Niels Philipsen***
1. Introduction
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) committee on consumer policy has taken a
number of initiatives to coordinate national policies and to explore
methods of dealing with new problems, such as those arising from e-
commerce. In exploring best practices in consumer policy, it has
recently addressed the effectiveness of penalties for breaches of
consumer protection legislation. 1
The interest of the OECD committee has been paralleled by
developments in the United Kingdom including, as part of the "better
regulation" enterprise, the Hampton report on Reducing
administrative burdens, published in 2005.2 This recognized, in
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Comparative Private Law and Economics at the Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Faculty of Law, The Netherlands.
** Professor of Law, University of Manchester, School of Law, United
Kingdom.
*** Associate Professor Economics of Law, Maastricht University, Faculty of
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1 See Anthony I. Ogus, Michael G. Faure, & Niels J. Philipsen, Best Practices
for Consumer Policy: Report on the Effectiveness of Enforcement Regimes,
DSTI/CP(2006)2 1/FINAL, Paris, OECD, December, 20 2006. available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/7/37863861 .doc [hereinafter "OECD Report"].
2 See Philip Hampton,, Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection
Enforcement, London, H.M. Treasury, 2005. available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/7/F/budO5hamptonv 1 .pdf.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
relation to regulatory contraventions, the important relationship
between the level of government intrusion in business by monitoring
activities and the level of penalties imposed following apprehension
and conviction. In response to the report, the British government
developed several studies to investigate regulatory enforcement
policy, headed by the better regulation penalties review, which
considered options that could add to the regulators' enforcement tool
box to better meet regulatory objectives and to improve compliance. 3
In 2005-2006, the UK Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) funded a study undertaken by the authors of this paper to meet
the objective of the better regulation project in the context of
consumer protection and to acquire evidence on best practices for the
OECD committee project on consumer policy. 4 In this paper we draw
on the study to provide an overview of different enforcement
practices that are used and to draw some tentative conclusions
regarding their likely effectiveness.
For the DTI project, we obtained information on consumer
protection enforcement practices across OECD jurisdictions on the
basis of a questionnaire sent to members of the OECD consumer
policy committee. This was complemented by information obtained
directly from printed and electronic sources. On the basis of this
information, we classified the national systems into five models,
reflecting key variables in enforcement policy. To enrich our
understanding of these models and to assist in the evaluation of the
policy options by drawing on the experience of those engaged in
enforcement processes, we then undertook case-studies in
jurisdictions which we considered to be representative of the models.
In section two, we provide the overview of current approaches
to sanctions and enforcement in OECD jurisdictions and our
classification of them into five models. Then follows our comparison
of the key enforcement characteristics in the four case-studies. The
paper concludes in the fourth section with some observations on these
comparisons and the implications that they have for effective
enforcement policy.
In some jurisdictions, reform of the enforcement systems was,
at the time of our study, being discussed or in the process of
implementation. This paper draws only on information available to us
at the end of 2006, but with reference to some later developments
3 See Richard Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-Hampton
World, Consultation Document, London, Better Regulation Executive, 2006.
available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45183.pdf
4 OECD Report, supra note 1.
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known to us. These include, most significantly, legislative proposals
by the UK government which, if implemented, would radically
change the approach to enforcement in that jurisdiction. 5
2. Survey of approaches to sanctions and enforcement
in OECD jurisdictions
Introduction
In this section, we provide a general picture of the
enforcement regimes used for consumer protection regulation in
OECD jurisdictions.6 The information was obtained primarily from
written responses to questions sent to representative officials from
those jurisdictions. Given that we did not receive responses from a
number of jurisdictions, our survey is not comprehensive but
nevertheless provides a good indication of arrangements in a wide
variety of industrialized countries. Of course, the very diversity of the
regulatory and legal cultures meant that it was not always easy to
tabulate the information we received within pre-defined categories
and it proved necessary to simplify what are often complex
procedures and arrangements. Although the officials who provided
the information were given the opportunity subsequently to verify our
classifications, descriptions and summaries, we cannot be entirely
confident that what follows provides a completely accurate picture of
the law and practice in the relevant jurisdictions.
A particular problem arose from the fact that within the broad
area of consumer protection legislation in any one jurisdiction there
might be considerable differences between the approaches taken to a
5 At the time of writing, the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill 2008
[hereinafter RES Bill] is being considered by the UK Parliament, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldbills/046/08046.i-iv.html.
6 For an excellent, but slightly outdated, overview of consumer protection laws
in South American countries (including their enforcement and the role of consumer
groups) see Robert G. Vaughn, Consumer Protection Laws in South America 17
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 275-322 (1994).; Robert G. Vaughn 22,
Chilean Consumer Protection Standards and the United Nations Guidelines on
Consumer Protection: A Comparative Study Revealing Regional Conflicts, N.C. J.
INT'L & COM. REG. 1, 1-17.(1996). The latter paper also considers United Nations
Guidelines on consumer protection. The first attempt at a more comprehensive
analysis of consumer protection legislation in the EU (more specifically, the then
nine EC countries) can be found in Nobert N. Reich & Hans W. Micklitz,
CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: A
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE EC COMMISSION (1980).
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variety of regulatory controls. To mitigate these difficulties,
respondents were asked to describe the processes for three "typical"
contraventions giving rise only to financial loss:
1. A trader offering television sets on the Internet fails
to provide the buyer with information on the right to
cancel the purchase.7
2. A second hand car dealer interferes with the
odometer of a vehicle so that it registers fewer
kilometers/miles than the vehicle has travelled.
3. A label attached to a food item in a store
misleadingly indicates that the customer will only
pay 50% of the "normal" price.
These examples themselves gave rise to differentiated
responses because in some jurisdictions, for example, scenario one
has consequences only in private law, while the second scenario
frequently gives rise to criminal prosecutions, as fraud is often
involved. Nevertheless, although some of the generalizations which
we drew from the responses undoubtedly oversimplified the detailed
arrangements which exist, they can be considered sufficient both to
indicate the variety of processes used in individual jurisdictions and
to enable comparisons between them to be made. We should also
stress that the tables below, which summarize the questionnaire
responses, relate only to the three typical contraventions which we
have identified above and not to other breaches of consumer
protection legislation.
In relation to enforcement law and practice, there would seem
to be seven principal areas which give rise to important policy
options:
1. monitoring trader behavior
2. procedures following detection of contraventions,
but preceding the imposition of sanctions
3. procedures for administrative and civil sanctions
7 See also Michael Cordera, E-Consumer Protection: A Comparative Analysis
of EU and US Consumer Protection on the Internet. 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L. J. 231, 231-263 (2001) (analyzes consumer protection on the internet
more generally, from a comparative (EU versus US) point of view).
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4. categories of administrative and civil sanctions
5. procedures for criminal sanctions
6. categories of criminal sanctions
7. enforcement by consumers
Our survey is divided accordingly.
Monitoring of Trader Behavior
Major differences arise between jurisdictions regarding the
monitoring of trader behavior in order to detect contraventions. As
indicated in Table 1, the approach taken by the enforcement agencies
in some countries is not to engage in pro-active monitoring, but
instead to respond to complaints from consumers and third parties.
This we refer to as reactive monitoring. Where pro-active monitoring
is adopted, it may be undertaken on a random basis or rather by
reference to some risk-assessment model which aims to target
resources on cases where contraventions are more likely. The second
and third rows of Table 1 show that the agencies in some jurisdictions
engage in both strategies.
It is important to appreciate that the generalizations in this
table merely indicate the main monitoring strategy in the particular
jurisdiction. A country categorized as engaging in 'random proactive
monitoring' does not exclude the possibility of some reactive
monitoring in cases of suspected contraventions.
Table 1:8 A roaches to Monitoring
< < N Z Z
Reactive
monitoring
(if any)
Random
pro-active 
./ '
monitoring
Risk-
adjusted
pro-active '/ ' 4 ,/ ,
monitoring
8 The jurisdictions are, from left to right, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Finland, Hungary,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, and the
United States of America.
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Procedures Following Detection of Contraventions, but
Preceding The Imposition of Sanctions
In those jurisdictions, such as Denmark, Germany, and the
Netherlands, where the public agency adopts a reactive rather than
pro-active policy to monitoring, complaints are in general taken
forward, with or without the aid of some consumer association, to an
ombudsman institution, to a self-regulatory organization, or to a
tribunal or court which has power to enforce private rights, in each
case with some expectation that the dispute will be resolved by
means of ADR procedures, that is without resort to formal legal
enforcement processes.
In other jurisdictions, the decision is taken by the enforcement
agency on how to proceed. 9 If, on the basis of a consumer (or third
party) complaint or its own investigations, it believes that a
contravention has taken place, it can - especially in more serious
cases - move directly to the procedures for imposing a penalty (see
below). However, there are some intermediate options which are
more usually adopted as an alternative. These include notably:
a) Discharging the trader with (or without) an informal
warning.
b) Negotiating an informal agreement with the trader to
comply.
c) Issuing a formal warning or order to comply.
Option (c) may indeed be mandatory before any further
sanction can be imposed, indicating that in practice the relevant
penalties are imposed only for second or repeated contraventions.
In most jurisdictions responding to the survey, agencies have
a broad discretion whether to adopt any of the above options or else
engage in a formal sanction procedure. However, in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, it seems that negotiations between trader and
agency and formal or informal warnings are not allowed (presumably
because of a fear that officials will abuse their discretion); and in
Hungary and Poland, no informal warnings are permitted, but
9 An example for this approach would be the DG for Enforcement and
Mediation of the Federal Public Service for Economic Affairs (in Dutch: Algemene
Directie Controle en Beniddeling van de Federale Overheidsdienst Economie)
under Belgian law, situated in Brussels.
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negotiations can lead to a formal warning or voluntary compliance
agreement.
Procedures for Administrative and Civil Sanctions
Table 2 highlights some of the key differences emerging from
the survey with respect to the procedures for the imposition of
administrative and civil sanctions.
Table 2: 10 Procedures for Administrative and Civil Sanctions
AUS BEL CAN CZE GBR HUN JPN NOR NZL POL SVK SWE USA
alt.inst '4 X '4 X '4 X X X X X X (3)
Oral '4 X '4 X '4 X ' X '4 X '4(1) X 4
fault (2)X '4 4 '4 X X (2) X X '4 (2) X
etc
Sett 4 X 4 X 4 '4 X '4 ' '4 X '4 '4
(1) Generally.
(2) Varies according to offense and circumstances.
(3) Some sanctions may be issued directly; others must be referred.
"Alt. inst" signifies that the administrative agency cannot
itself impose the sanction, but must refer the matter to another
institution, for example a court or tribunal, for a formal decision on
the trader's responsibility and the appropriateness of the sanction. As
the table reveals, this is a characteristic of Anglophone/common law
jurisdictions. Such referral normally has the consequence that the
sanction will be imposed only after an oral hearing, but - as the
second row reveals - that requirement may apply even where the
administrative agency has power itself to impose the sanction.
Several procedural conditions may have to be satisfied before
there can be a formal condemnation of the trader and the imposition
of some sanction. The third row of Table 2 provides an indication of
whether some element of fault or knowledge on the part of the trader
must be established. Although the absence of this requirement
implies strict liability, there is a distinction to be drawn between
regimes which allow some defense, for example "due diligence" or
"reasonable mistake", and those where no defense is available and
which may therefore be called "absolute liability." However, on the
10 The Netherlands is not included in this table because administrative
sanctions do not play a significant role in the enforcement of the areas of consumer
protection legislation covered in this paper; see infra Section 5.
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basis of the information obtained in the survey, it was not possible to
identify the jurisdictions which do, and do not, allow the defenses.
It should be noted, finally, that in all the surveyed
jurisdictions, except the Czech Republic, Japan and Slovakia, the
administrative agencies are allowed to negotiate with traders, leading
to agreements by the latter voluntarily to comply with their
obligations. The effect of such an agreement is, presumably, little
different from a formal compliance order or injunction, leading to
possible penalties in the event of further non-compliance.
Administrative Sanctions
Table 3 lists the sanctions available to the enforcement
agencies in the jurisdictions responding to the survey. Included are
those that may be imposed by a court or tribunal on the application of
the administrative agency, but not if it is part of the criminal justice
process. We distinguish here between administrative and civil
sanctions mainly on the basis of the institution which imposes the
particular sanction. Administrative sanctions are thus sanctions
imposed by an administrative agency. Civil sanctions have the aim of
providing redress to the consumer who suffered a loss." These
sanctions will mainly be imposed by civil judges, although (as the
table indicates) some jurisdictions also allow civil sanctions (like
compensation) to be imposed through an administrative agency.
Table 3:12 Categories of Administrative and Civil Sanctions
Fine X 4 4 4 X XX 4 4 4 (1) (2)
Prohib 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
imprison X X X X X x x X x X X 4 X X x
Comp 4 X X x x x x x X X 4 4 4 4
Conf 4 x X X x X X X X X X X 4 x 4
Cease X X X 4 X X X X (2) X X X 4 x 4
shame 4 4 4 x x q x x 4 x 4 4 4 4
'1 See generally, Andrew S. Burrows, English Private Law, (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007) for an introduction to English private law.
12 Supra note 10.
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Costs x x x x x x x - -
Other -4 - -4
(1) Power to issue a "default fine" if prohibition not obeyed.
(2) Only for certain contraventions.
"Fine" indicates some financial penalty, although the sum in
question might be relatively small and there may be an attempt to
avoid the language of criminal penalties, hence a "financial notice" or
"financial charge". "Prohib" covers a variety of enforceable
undertakings for future compliance, such as "cease offense" orders,
prohibition orders or injunctions. Imprisonment ("imprison") is
included even though it appears to be available as an administrative
sanction in only one jurisdiction. The question (which we cannot
address within the scope of this paper) of course arises, to what
extent the imposition of a prison sanction through an administrative
agency can be reconciled with the requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 13 "Comp" indicates a power to award
compensation to the consumer-victim as an administrative measure
rather than as a consequence of the enforcement of a private right (on
which see below). "Conf" indicates that there is some power to
confiscate relevant goods of the offending trader or to disgorge
profits acquired as a result of the contravention. "Cease" covers
orders forbidding the individual or firm from continuing to trade
generally or in a particular market. A policy of "naming and
shaming", by providing or authorizing some publicity of
contraventions, is indicated by "shame". Finally "costs" means that
the agency can recover from the trader at least some part of the costs
incurred in the administrative procedure.
The survey revealed two relatively unfamiliar sanctions. In
Poland, the relevant agency may require the payment of "a certain
amount of money for social purposes relating to support of the
national culture or protection of the national heritage, if the act of
unfair competition was caused by fault". In Australia, the Federal
Court can, on an application by the enforcement agency, impose a
"probation order" to establish a compliance program, an education
and training program, or a direction to revise the internal operations
of the business.'
13 One would in particular think of the requirements expressed in Art. 6 that
have to be met. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC 13-4318-B457-C90149
16D7A/O/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
'4 The United States Federal Trade Commission has similar powers.
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Procedures for Criminal Sanctions
The procedural and other requirements for the imposition of
criminal sanctions generally differ considerably from those used for
administrative sanctions. Table 4 reflects some of these differences.
Table 4:15 Procedures for Criminal Sanctions
U~~ ~ e 0 N P >
M V U U U Z Z e
pub.pros 44 4 X (d) 4 4 4 X 4 4 4 4
fault etc X(b) 4 (c) 4 X X(b) 4 (c) 4 X 4 (c) 4 4
Sett X 4(a) 1 4 X X X X X X X X X 4
(a) Negotiate administrative fine.
(b) Subject to defenses e.g. mistake/due diligence.
(c) Varies between offenses.
(d) The enforcement agency prosecutes criminal offenses in the magistrates
courts.
The first row shows that in all countries, except New Zealand
and the United Kingdom (in part), prosecutions must be brought, and
therefore decisions on whether to prosecute made, by a public agency
distinct from that which investigates the contravention. Typically the
latter agency is responsible for criminal prosecutions generally. The
second row reveals that more may be required by way of proof of
blameworthiness, relating to the intention, knowledge or fault of the
trader; or defenses of, for example, "due diligence" or "reasonable
excuse" may be available. As the third row suggests, negotiations
("sett") between the prosecuting authorities and the defendant trader
may not be allowed, but in practice some form of plea-bargaining
may exist even if it is not formally authorized.
There are also special rules of criminal procedure, particularly
relating to what evidence may be relied on by the prosecution; and
there may be a heavier burden of proof on the prosecutor. For
example, in common law jurisdictions, the prosecution must
substantiate the allegation "beyond all reasonable doubt" as opposed
to "on the balance of probabilities", which applies in administrative
or civil cases.
'5 Supra note 10.
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Criminal Sanctions
Table 5 contains our understanding of the sanctions available
in the criminal process in the jurisdictions responding to the survey.
The abbreviations are the same as those used in Table 3.
Tbe516
Table 5: 1Categories of Criminal Sanctions
M U U U a. (1 LZ .1i za9. V) )
fine 4 4 '4 4 4 4 '4(4) 4 '4 4 4 4 4 '4 4(3) 4
,rohib 4 X 4 4 4 X 4 X 4 X X X 4 4 X 4
imprison 4(l) 4(5) 4 4 4 4 4(1) 4 X 4 4 '4(3) 4 4 X 4
comp '4 4(6) ? 4(6) 4 X X X X X X '4 4 4 X 4
conf X 4 4 4 X X X 4 X 4 4 4(3) 4 4 X 4
cease X 4(5) 4 X X X X 4 X X X 4(3) X X 4(3) 4
shame 4 X 4 4 X X 4 X X X X 4 4 X X 417
2osts 4 x x 4 X X 4 X 4 X 4 4 4 X X 4
other 4(2) 1 .7
(1) Only if failure to pay fine or for contempt of court.
(2) Probation order to establish a compliance program, an education and
training program, or a direction to revise the internal operations of the
business.
(3) Odometer tampering cases only.
(4) Only following contravention of order or of voluntary undertaking.
(5) Some cases only.
(6) Only if civil claim attached.
Enforcement by consumers
Many contraventions of consumer protection regulation also
constitute infringements of consumers' private rights, especially
those arising under contract law, and enforcement of these rights can
help with regulatory compliance. Quite apart from this, consumers
(and third parties) may be allowed to contribute to the regulatory
enforcement processes. 8 It was important, therefore, to examine the
16 Id.
17 In the United States, "naming and shaming" is not a specific sanction,
although press releases about cases, are issued which may have a similar effect.
'8 For an overview as to possibilities of private enforcement and their
weaknesses see Kati J. Cseres, 'Enforcement of collective consumer interests: a
competition law perspective' in Van Boom, Willem & Loos, Marco 'Collective
Enforcement of Consumer Law', 125 - 172 (2007).
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possibilities in the different jurisdictions, although such matters as the
fostering and financing of consumer protection networks and the
provision of institutions for the cheap adjudication of disputes lie
outside the ambit of this paper.19
There would appear to be four principal procedural methods
of enabling consumer activism to complement and enhance the public
enforcement of regulatory contraventions:
i) enabling the consumer to initiate administrative
proceedings for a regulatory contravention;
ii) enabling the consumer to initiate a criminal
prosecution for a regulatory contravention - a long-
standing tradition in common law jurisdictions
enabling the consumer to use the administrative or
criminal determinations of a contravention as evidence
for the purpose of a private law claim;
iii) enabling a consumer to combine a private right claim
with the administrative or criminal processes - a long-
standing tradition (partie civile) within some civil law
jurisdictions.2 °
Table 6 provides an indication of the relevant procedural
arrangements in those jurisdictions which supplied us with
information on these possibilities.
19 Jules Stuyck, Evelyne Terryn, Veerle Colaert, Tom Van Dyck, Neil Peretz,
Nele Hoekx, & Piotr Tereszkiewicz, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative
Means of Consumer Redress other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial
Proceedings, A study for the European Commission (Leuven: Study Centre for
Consumer Law - Centre for European Economic Law) (2007) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports-studies/comparative-report-en.pdf.
This study provides a comprehensive overview of "alternative means of consumer
redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings" in the field of
consumer protection in the EU, Australia, Canada and the United States. It focuses
on consumer redress only. Cafaggi, Fabrizio & Micklitz, Hans-W., Administrative
and Judicial Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law in the US and the European
Community EUI LAW Working Paper No. 2007/22 available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1024103.
20 Mario Chiavario, Private Parties: the Rights of the Defendant and the
Victim, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL Procedures, 541 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R.
Spencer ed., 2005).
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Table 6: Procedures for Private Enforcement by Consumers
S L < = N , o N 0 >
S U U U U2 Z Z z -CL CA
) 4 X X X X X X X ? 4 X (5) X"
ii) 4 X X (2) (2) 4 X 4(1) ? ? 4 (3) X
iii) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 4 4 4
iv) X (4) X 4 X X X 4 x 4 x (4) X
(1) In theory, but not in practice.
(2) Only via the police.
(3) Can be "associated with" public prosecution.
(4) Only in the criminal process.
(5) Participation as "intervener".
Classification of Approaches
On the basis of the information obtained in our survey, it
became possible to classify the responding jurisdictions into
groupings which reflect the key characteristics of our investigations,
notably whether a public agency engages in pro-active monitoring of
traders, and whether financial penalties are imposed as a consequence
of primarily administrative, civil, or criminal procedures. Five
broad approaches are evident:
a) Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree
of monitoring and investigation by administrative
agencies and, for the purposes of punishment and
deterrence, there is reliance on the possibility of
penalties being imposed as a result of criminal
justice proceedings.
b) Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree of
monitoring and investigation by administrative
agencies but efforts to secure compliance are
focused on agencies taking proceedings against
traders in the civil courts, although this does not
preclude the possibility of criminal prosecutions.
21 There is no private right of action under the FTC Act, but some federal
statutes enforced by the FTC do allow individuals to bring claims. Individual state
laws may also contain private rights of action.
22 For a similar exercise in classification, see Department of Trade and
Industry, Comparative Report on Consumer Policy Regimes (2003) (UK), available
at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file34673.pdf.
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c) Jurisdictions in which there is a significant degree
of monitoring and investigation by administrative
agencies and the latter themselves have the power to
impose (generally modest) financial penalties. This
does not preclude the possibility of criminal
prosecutions or civil proceedings.
d) Jurisdictions in which a public institution (such as
an Ombudsman) exists to receive complaints from
consumers and third parties and that agency may be
instrumental in initiating proceedings in a civil
court or referring the case for prosecution in the
criminal courts.
e) Jurisdictions in which there is little or no
monitoring of traders by an administrative agency
and it is mainly left to the consumers, aided by
voluntary or publicly-funded consumer
associations, to enforce private rights against
defaulting traders, or else to resort to self-regulatory
dispute settlement processes. Administrative and/or
criminal proceedings by a residual, public
enforcement agency are taken only in exceptional
cases.
Table 7:23 Classification of A proaches to Sanctions and Enforcement
-~z z . #
a) 1 _
b) -/ "
d)
e) I4 4 1_
In Table 7, we attempt to identify the responding jurisdictions
with these models, although at the risk of over-simplification. To
some extent the classifications reflect legal traditions and cultures, so
that, for example, the Anglophone/common law jurisdictions tend to
adopt mainly models a) and b), former members of the East-
23 This is based only upon the federal/national enforcement law and practice;
significant differences may apply to state/provincial/canton law and practice.
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European bloc model c), Scandinavian countries model d), and
Germanic countries Model e). 24
Switzerland is a hybrid in that, while much trade is self-
regulated and there is no specialist administrative agency for
consumer protection regulation, there is significant reliance on the
criminal law for compliance purposes nevertheless. Japan and the
United Kingdom are also placed in two categories because, in both
jurisdictions, there are different enforcement agencies, relying on
different powers and sanctions, for legislation for which they have
responsibility. 25 The United States is placed in two categories
because its main consumer protection enforcement authority, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), relies both on the courts as well as
26its own enforcement authority to sanction law violators. Finally,
Sweden is placed in models c) and d) because it has both an
Ombudsman's office, which represents consumers in disputes, and a
Consumer Agency, which has supervisory authority for consumer
protection legislation.27
3. Case-Studies and Comparative Overview
As was mentioned in the introduction, we undertook case-
studies in four jurisdictions to explore in greater depth the key
characteristics of the different models of enforcement policy. The
24 With respect to models d and e, see also Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 19
at 6-7.
25 In the United Kingdom, for instance, the enforcement of these areas of
consumer protection regulation is primarily undertaken by the Trading Standards
Service (TSS). However, there is an institution responsible for co-ordinating
practice and policy (Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services -
LACORS). The Enterprise Act 2002 also confers powers of enforcement in this
area on the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), where a breach of the law "harms the
collective interests of consumers."
26 Dean Alderman, however, notes that in the United States there is a trend
towards (pre-dispute) mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts, replacing
consumer law. He argues that because of this consumer protection is decreasing.
Richmard M. Alderman, The Future of Consumer Law in the United States-Hello
Arbitration, Bye-bye Courts, So-long Consumer Protection, U of Houston Law
Center No. 2008-A-09 (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/
abstract=1015517.
27 For a more detailed comment on the approach of the Nordic countries see
Klaus Viitanen: 'Enforcement of consumers' collective interests by regulatory
agencies in the Nordic countries', in Van Boom, Willem & Loos, Marco
'Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law', p. 83 - 103 (2007).
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resources made available enabled us to select only four jurisdictions
for closer scrutiny. The United Kingdom was selected as an example
of model a), primarily relying on the criminal justice system for
financial penalties, Australia as an example of model b) where
administrative agencies use primarily the civil justice system to
impose sanctions, and Belgium as an example of model c) in which
administrative agencies have power themselves to impose financial
penalties. The common feature of models d) and e), those primarily
relying on consumer complaints to an ombudsman and those
primarily relying on self-regulatory arrangements and the
enforcement of private rights, is that they depend on a strong culture
of consumer activism. For the fourth jurisdiction, reflecting this
dominant characteristic of both models d) and e), we selected the
Netherlands.
Within the scope of this paper it is of course not possible to
discuss the details of the four legal systems.28 Rather we will focus
on some key characteristics of the particular jurisdiction: the
monitoring systems; whether administrative financial penalties exist;
the roles of the criminal and civil law; and the types of penalties
imposed.
Key Characteristics
In Australia, at the federal level, most consumer protection
regulation is contained in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). 29 The
object of the TPA is to "enhance the welfare of Australians through
the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for
consumer protection., 30 With regard to consumer protection, the civil
remedy provisions are set out in Part V, with equivalent criminal
liability provisions in Part VC. 31
Australia places great emphasis on recourse to civil sanctions
(relative to criminal sanctions) in the enforcement of consumer
28 For more detailed information to the OECD report, see OECD Report, supra
note 1.
29 Trade Practices Act, 1974, (Austl.) available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
legis/cth/consol_act/tpa 1974149.
'0 Id. at Part 1, § 2.
31 This is enforced by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
and principally concerns the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission Act 2001.
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protection legislation. 32 Civil proceedings are perceived to be an
effective way of dealing with many recalcitrant traders but the
sanctions available are considered to be limited and officials would
favour the introduction of civil pecuniary penalties as a further option
to deter some offenders. One particularly interesting civil remedy
available to the Australian enforcement authority is the "probation
order" to be discussed below; this is regarded as an important device
for inducing compliance. 33 The criminal process is seen as a last
resort, the process being too slow for most cases, but a worthwhile
option for some cases where the conduct is very serious and urgent
action is not required.34
Most consumer protection regulation in Belgium is contained
in the Fair Trade Practices Act 35, but this is complemented by
specific legislation governingparticular trading activities. Art. 116 of
the Fair Trade Practices Act" provides that the agents appointed by
the minister can, after the issuing of a pro justitia, the formal notice
of contravention, propose 37 the payment of a sum by the perpetrator
which will extinguish the criminal prosecution. This "transaction",
although not formally viewed as an administrative fine, is a financial
imposition which is considered to be an easy and low-cost means of
dealing with consumer protection offenses. In Belgium the criminal
law can theoretically be applied to the type of offenses we examined.
However, the ability of the criminal process to operate effectively in
relation to cases appropriate for the process was perceived to be
32 Interview with officials from the Australian Treasury, Competition and
Consumer Policy Division (April 5, 2006) [hereinafter ATC Interview]; Interview
with officials from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (May 3,
2006) [hereinafter ACCC Interview].
33 See supra note 29 at sec. 86(C)(2)(b) (non-punitive orders).
34 ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
35 Fair Trade Practices Act of 14 July 1991 translated at
http://mineco.fgov.be/protectionconsumer/tradepractices/tradelaw/lawonprot
ection en 001.htm (in Dutch: Wet betreffende de handelspraktijken en de
voorlichting en bescherming van de consument).
36 Id. at Art. 11.
37 The literal word used in the Dutch text is "voorstellen"; in the French text
proposer".
38 Interview with the Director General for Enforcement and Mediation of the
Federal Public Service for Economic Affairs (April 18, 2006) [hereinafter DGEM
Interview]; Interview with public prosecutor specializing in prosecuting socio-
economic crime (March 30, 2006) [hereinafter Prosecutor Interview].
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hampered by inadequate resources in the prosecution service and by
the fact that some of the cases referred to that service could more
appropriately be resolved in the civil courts.
The amount of Dutch legislation in the area of consumer
protection has traditionally been rather limited and there is much
reliance on self-regulation and private enforcement initiative, through
either individual consumer complaints or consumer organizations.
Some important institutional and legal changes have recently taken
place. As a consequence of EC Regulation 2006/2004 on Consumer
Protection Cooperation, a new authority was established in early
2007, the Netherlands Consumer Authority (Consumentenautoriteit,
hereafter CA), which operates under the Ministry of Economic
Affairs 40 . The CA concentrates on dealing with collective consumer
matters. Individual complaints from consumers can now be
forwarded to the existing Stichting Geschillencommissies voor
Consumentenzaken (Foundation of ADR Committees for Consumer
Affairs) among others.4'
Government interviewees in the Netherlands considered that
the system relying to a large extent on consumer activism, self-
regulation and the informal resolution of disputes works well where
contraventions are easily detected and where traders are
"benevolent"; but there is perceived to be inadequate deterrence of
"mala fide" traders.42 As a consequence of the recent reforms, the CA
is now able to initiate administrative proceedings for contraventions
of specific statutes 43 and particular provisions in the Civil Code 44 ,
39 See infra note 40.
40 The Enforcement of Consumer Protection Act (Wet Handhaving
Consumentenbescherming) was entered into force on December 29, 2006:
Staatsblad, 2006, 591 and 592. See also Michael A. Heldeweg, Supervisory
Governance: The case of the Dutch Consumer Authority, 2 UTRECHT L. REV., 67,
67-90, available at http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/publish/ articles/000018/
article.pdf, see also Sjoerd Ammerlaan & Dirk Janssen: 'The Dutch Consumer
Authority: an introduction', in Van Boom, Willem & Loos, Marco 'Collective
Enforcement of Consumer Law', 107 - 121 (2007).
41 Stichting Geschillencommissies voor Consumentenzaken, Jaarverslag 2005
p. 7 (2006).
42 Interview with three officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs
Directorate for Consumer Affairs, The Hague (April 19, 2006) [hereinafter MEA
Interview].
43 Prijzenwet (Prices Act) and Colportagewet (Canvassing Act) available (in
Dutch) at http://www.consumentenautoriteit.nlUWet-en-regelgeving.
44 Notably provisions on koop of afstand (distance selling) [Art. 46 BW7],
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although it appears that this typically occurs only if the self-
regulatory features of the market have not resolved the case. 45 The
principal sanction has become a fine and/or a financial penalty for
each day of continual infringement.
46
In the United Kingdom47 , consumer protection regulation is
contained both in primary and secondary legislation. Having evolved
from nineteenth century weights and measures and anti-adulteration
controls, administered by local authority officials and magistrates
courts, it has always relied heavily on the criminal justice system for
enforcement. 48 At present, 49 administrative fines cannot be imposed
for breaches of consumer legislation. Agency officials interviewed
considered the enforcement procedures to be generally effective, but
for serious cases there is perceived to be inadequate deterrence,
because the penalties imposed by the criminal courts are too low and
no adverse financial consequences are attached to enforcement orders
obtained in civil proceedings.
Monitoring
In Australia, there is an independent statutory authority that is
responsible for enforcing the TPA: the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC). The ACCC is the national
consumer protection agency in Australia and as such is involved in
misleidende reclame (misleading advertising) [Arts. 194-196 BW6] and oneerlijke
bedingen in consumentenovereenkomsten (unfair conditions in consumer
agreements) [Arts. 231-247 BW6].
45 For details see Consumentenautoriteit, "Consultatiedocument", September
2006, pp. 16 and 19. For more information see http://www.consumenten
autoriteit.nl/ca/content.jsp?objectid=5335.
46 MEA Interview, supra note 42; Interview with two policy officials from
Consumer Association (April 21, 2006) [hereinafter NCA Interview].
47 Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own legal systems and, particularly
in Scotland, some of the institutions and procedures used there differ from those in
England and Wales. To facilitate exposition, in this paper we refer, unless
otherwise indicated, to institutions and procedures operating in England and Wales.
For Scottish law see W.C.H. ERVINE, CONSUMER LAW IN SCOTLAND (2004).
48 Interview with an enforcement officer from Trading Standards Service
(March 9, 2006) [hereinafter TSS Interview]; Interview with an official from the
Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services (March 1, 2006)
[hereinafter LACORS Interview]; Interview with three officials from OFT (March
9, 2006) [hereinafter OFT Interview].
49 If the RES Bill, supra note 5, is passed the government will be able to confer
power on regulators to impose administrative fines.
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the monitoring of traders' activities and detection of contraventions
which involve significant consumer detriment.50 It is active at the
federal level and in that respect targets all conduct with a national or
international focus as well as cases where enforcement action will
have a broad national educative or deterrent effect. 51 However, it
does not usually monitor the behavior of traders of its own initiative;
rather it operates on the basis of complaints received from the ACCC
Infocentre.52 The information received enables the ACCC to
ascertain if there are trends or escalations of particular problems.53
Also, it can undertake a market study or an evaluation of a specific
area and may target education and compliance campaigns at specific
industry sectors.
In Belgium, the institution responsible for monitoring traders'
activities and detecting contravention is the DG for Enforcement and
Mediation (DGEM) of the Federal Public Service for Economic
Affairs. 55 The DGEM is organized at the federal level in Belgium
and has generally the duty to control and monitor compliance with
economic regulations in Belgium, governing both consumer
protection and competition.56 It has one central office and seven
regional offices.
57
Essentially, there are three ways in which an offense can be
detected by DGEM or its regional offices. 58 First, a complaint can be
filed by a consumer, a competitor (or any third party) or by the public
prosecutor services. 59 Second, a yearly programme formulates a
certain number of general inquiries by the central DGEM office,
50 ACCC Interview, supra note 32; see http://www.accc.gov.au for an
overview of the activities of the agency.
5' ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
52 id.
53 id.
54 id.
55 See supra note 10.
56 The legal basis can be found in the so-called Fair Trade Practices Act of 14
July 1991, published in the Moniteur Belge 29 August 1991 (in Dutch: Wet
betreffende de handelspraktijken en de voorlichting en bescherming van de
consument).
57 DGEM Interview, supra note 38.
58 id.
59 id.
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leading to targeted monitoring of traders in specific sectors by the
regional offices. 60 And third, there is individual and random
monitoring by officials.
61
Even though the monitoring does not take place on the basis
of a formal risk assessment, several relevant criteria are taken into
account to determine which potential contraventions or sectors will
more particularly be targeted.62 On the basis of these considerations,
points are attributed to, and aggregated for, each sector or
contravention, thus giving rise to a targeting strategy. 63 De facto,
inspectors spend most of their time on the targeted monitoring and
relatively less on inspections as a result of consumer complaints.64
Contraventions in the Netherlands are detected mainly
through complaints by consumers and other parties such as consumer
organizations and companies. 65 Until 2007 the FIOD-ECD (Tax
Control and Investigation Service - Economic Surveillance Unit) had
sole authority to enforce the Prijzenwet and the Colportagewet , but
it did not actively monitor the market. The FIOD-ECD only reacted
in cases of repeated consumer complaints and when public health is
endangered. The CA is now responsible for the enforcement of this
legislation and the situation will probably change only slightly, with
the CA perhaps being able to react sooner to consumer complaints.
67
But this is a matter of conjecture, considering the very recent
60 In the yearly reports, which are published by DGEM, priorities are set which
are followed in a structured monitoring.
61 For example, the yearly report of 2003 of DGEM mentions that 4,897
traders were subjected to control and that in 4.06% of cases a contravention was
found.
62 Interviewees described that on the basis of a variety of elements (e.g.
whether consumer safety is at stake, the importance of the number of complaints
etc.) a 'hitparade of contraventions' is formulated whereby every sector or
contravention receives a number of points. On that basis the decision is made to
target on specific areas.
63 Id.
64 DGEM Interview, supra note 38.
65 id.
66 Enforcement of Consumer Protection Act supra, note 40.
67 The official document establishing the Consumer Authority is the Consumer
Protection Enforcement Act of 20 November 2006, Implementation Regulation
2004/2006 ('Wet van 20 november 2006, houdende regels omtrent instanties die
verantwoordelijk zijn voor handhaving van de wetgeving inzake
consumentenbescherming (Wet handhaving consumentenbescherming)').
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introduction of this institution. It is mainly for the market parties to
react against consumer protection contraventions. As a result of self-
regulation, a large number of dispute settlement arrangements exist
which function satisfactorily in a large number of cases, because
consumers are very active in complaining.
Given that the Netherlands is so dependent on consumer
activism for the enforcement of consumer protection law, efforts have
been made to study the extent of such activism. Research conducted
in 2004 by the independent management consultancy company
Twynstra Gudde has shown that 22% of consumers do not take their
complaint back to the supplier. 68 Furthermore, about 43% of
consumers who return to the supplier with a complaint are
dissatisfied with the way it is handled.
There has been a difference in the perceptions of government
and consumer organizations concerning the need for active
monitoring. 70 The government interviewees argued for relying
largely on consumer organizations and stressed that in the
Netherlands since the 1980s the general policy has been one of
withdrawing government and deregulation.' However, the
Consumentenbond itself suggests that these high expectations cannot
be met for it is purely a private organizations and therefore not
always the appropriate agency.72 It stressed that there should be a
much more active role for government since, in its perception, there
is today insufficient deterrence.
It is not anticipated that the approach will change much after
the introduction of the CA. However, some targeted monitoring now
takes place by focusing on specific priorities, which include internet
trade, the travelling branch, misleadinE lotteries,
warranties/guarantees and "unfair general conditions."7 Also there is
an information desk, Consuwijzer, for non-business consumers,
organized jointly by the CA, the Competition Authority NMA and
68 Twynstra Gudde, Onderzoek naar ajhandeling van individuele
consumentenklachten (study on the handling of individual consumer complaints),
April 2004. Quoted in Ministry of Economic Affairs, Strategic Action Programme:
Policy paper on consumer protection, June 2004, pp. 8-9 and 24.
69 Id.
70 MEA Interview, supra note 42; NCA Interview, supra note 46.
71 MEA Interview, supra note 42.
72 NCA Interview, supra note 46.
73 Consumentenautoriteit, supra note 64, pp. 13-14.
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OPTA (regulator post and electronic communications). 74  If
Consuwijzer receives many similar complaints, investigations could
in theory take place. 75
In the United Kingdom, the enforcement of these areas of
consumer protection regulation is primarily undertaken by the
Trading Standards Service (TSS). 76 There are 202 TSS offices,
operating under the aegis of local government, and the local
authorities take responsibility for funding and setting priorities for the
Service. However, there is an institution responsible for
coordinating practice and policy (Local Authorities Coordinators of
Regulatory Services - LACORS).78 Powers of enforcement in this
area are also conferred on the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is
a national, semi-autonomous agency with general responsibilities for
the development and enforcement of competition law and consumer
protection; it is funded by central government.
79
Consumer complaints play a large role in relation to detection
and the processes of enforcement, but much pro-active monitoring,
particularly by the TSS, does take place.8 ° Some random inspection
of traders is undertaken, but monitoring proceeds usually on the basis
of risk assessment, traders being typically categorized into groups of
"high", "medium" or "low" risk by reference to scores reflecting key
variables, including for example the probability of the risk occurring,
the complexity of the activity, the number of consumers potentially
affected, and local history management. 81
This brief overview shows that Australia, Belgium and the
United Kingdom rely largely on publicly financed institutions which
adopt a pro-active approach to the monitoring of traders whereas the
Netherlands have institutions which adopt a more reactive approach,
relying largely on responding to the complaints of consumers and
third parties.
74 See Consuwijzer available at http://www.consuwijzer.nl.
75 id.
76 For further information, visit http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/.
77 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
78 Visit http://www.lacors.gov.uk/lacors/home.aspx.
79 For more information visit http://www.oft.gov.uk.
80 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
81 j 
.
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Administrative Financial Penalties
Australia does not have a system of administrative fines. Only
the courts have power to make orders concerning remedies in relation
to contraventions or offenses pursuant to the TPA. The ACCC itself
cannot make findings of consumer protection contraventions and
cannot impose sanctions. It may apply to the Federal Court to seek
orders to grant damages, make declarations, secure enforceable
undertakings, and impose injunctions. Currently fines cannot be
imposed in civil proceedings for breach of consumer protection
legislation. Such "pecuniary penalties" are only available for breach
of competition provisions. At the time of our study a government
working party was reviewing the civil remedies available under Part
V of the TPA and has released a discussion paper examining the
desirabili% of civil pecuniary penalties and/or banning orders for
directors.
In Belgium the administration can, when a contravention has
been established, propose an administrative "transaction" to the
perpetrator. The device is at the discretion of the administrative
agency: usually it will be the regional officers that propose a
"transaction", but the formal decision to make the offer is made at the
central level of DGEM. Several considerations are relevant to the
discretion, including the seriousness of the offense, whether there is
significant damage and whether it is a second (or repeated) offense.
If, in these situations, it is considered inappropriate to offer the
transaction, the case might then be referred directly to the public
prosecutor. There is no formal hearing or interrogation before a
transaction is offered. In practice, the proposal of the payment of a
transaction is made three months after the perpetrator receives the pro
justitia. This means that traders can use the period of three months to
formulate their comments on the allegations in the pro justitia and
communicate them to the administrative agency. Such comments are
taken into account in determining whether or not to offer the
transaction and this decision is taken without the prior approval or
consent of the public prosecutor.
As regards the amount of the payment, there is a Royal
Decree, issued under the Fair Trade Practices Act, which stipulates
82 Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs, Civil penalties for Australia's
consumer protection provisions, Discussion Paper, September 2005; see also
http://www.consumer.gov.au/html/civilpenalties/index.html, (last visted May.29,
2008 (includes many public submissions).
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the margin within which the administration can offer a transaction. 83
The maximum amount is currently E500,000. 8
4
There is no formal appeal against the proposal of a
transaction. 85 This is justified on the basis that the transaction is not a
formal administrative fine, but rather an opportunity offered to the
offender to avoid the criminal justice process. 86 An aggrieved trader
can simply choose not to pay and the case will then be referred to the
public prosecutor. 87 From this characterization it follows, too, that it
is not possible for the administrative agency itself to initiate
proceedings to claim the money proposed.88
In the Netherlands, as noted above, the CA now has powers to
impose a fine (with a maximum of currently E 67,000 per
contravention). 89 Before such an imposition, the CA first has to make
a report on the "accusation" and send it to the trader, who will then
have the opportunity to make representations, either in writing or at
an oral hearing. 90 Moreover, any decision taken by the CA is subject
to an administrative appeal within the CA itself, and subsequently to
the Civil Court of Rotterdam and to the Trade and Industry Appeals
Tribunal. 9 1
In the United Kingdom, the enforcement authorities have
available a variety of enforcement options for dealing with the
perpetrators of contraventions, including seeking to secure a
voluntary agreement to comply or to initiating proceedings for an
83 Royal Decree of 27 April 1993, Moniteur Belge, 22 May 1993.
84 Royal Decree of 13 July 2001, Moniteur Beige, 11 August 2001.
85 This is clear from Article 116 of the Fair Trade Practices Act. The Act
provides that the agents appointed by the Minister can, after a violation has been
established, propose the payment of a sum by the perpetrator which will extinguish
the criminal prosecution. No mention is made of any possibility of appeal.
86 DGEM Interview, supra note 38.
87 Prosecutor Interview, supra note 38.
88 This follows from the Fair Trade Practices Act where no possibility was
foreseen for the administrative agency to initiate proceedings.
89 See Article 2.9 in conjuction with Article 2.15 of Consumer Protection
Enforcement Act of 20 November 2006 ('Wet van 20 november 2006, houdende
regels omtrent instanties die verantwoordelijk zijn voor handhaving van de
wetgeving inzake consumentenbescherming (Wet handhaving
consumentenbescherming)).
90 See id. at Article 2.12.
91 Id.
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injunction or enforcement order.9 2 However, they cannot impose a
financial penalty; a fact that was perceived to inhibit deterrence.
93
Indeed, the LACORS, TSS and OFT representatives all considered
that enforcement would be facilitated by conferring on TSS and OFT
the possibility of imposing financial penalty notices, although such a
reform (it was thought) should not lead to the removal of any power,
in appropriate cases, to undertake a criminal prosecution.
94
Under the new British legislative proposals, the agencies may
be granted power to impose either fixed monetary X enalties or, for
more serious offenses, variable monetary penalties. In either case,
offenders can seek a review of the decision or appeal against the
imposition. 96 The penalties would operate to provide immunity to the
offender from later criminal prosecution and if the penalty is not paid,
proceedings to recover it and any further liable payments will have to
be made to the civil courts.
97
Criminal Law
In Australia, breaches of the criminal consumer protection
provisions under Part VC of the TPA are investigated by the ACCC
but prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 98 In
determining whether a given matter is suitable for criminal
prosecution, the DPP has regard to its own enforcement priorities and
in particular the Commonwealth Prosecution Policy. Factors which
are taken into account include the prospects of a conviction (which
depends on the availability of admissible evidence and defenses open
to the accused) and the public interest (including seriousness of the
offense and the need for deterrence). 99 Compared to civil cases,
criminal investigations are time-consuming and are generally not
seen as effective for rapidly stopping illegal conduct or providing
92 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 RES Bill, supra note 5, Part III.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
99 Id.
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timely consumer redress.' 00  For companies, the additional
consequences of a criminal conviction include reputational damage
and the possibility of significant financial penalties. Imprisonment is
currently not available as a sanction for contraventions of TPA Part
VC. However, it may be imposed for a failure to pay a fine imposed
under this regulation.
In Belgium, a case can reach the public prosecutor because a
consumer or trader has filed a complaint with the police. This
accounts for less than 10% of prosecutions; the majority are referred
by the administrative agencies. There are here two possibilities: the
administration considers the case unsuitable for proposing a
transaction, perhaps because it is a second offense, perhaps because
of its complexity; or the trader has not paid the transaction.' 01 The
public prosecutor then has the following options: to send a police
officer (in uniform) to the trader asking why the proposal of a
transaction was not accepted - apparently this leads to payment in a
large number of cases; to propose a new transaction (offered by the
public prosecutor, not the administrator) and of an amount which can
be higher or lower than in the first offer; to dismiss the case; or to
proceed to prosecute in court. 1 02
The public prosecutor can decide to dismiss a case or offer a
transaction in cases where the administration has expressed a clear
preference for prosecution.' 03 This might result from the prosecutor
giving greater weight to the particular facts of the case, elements like
guilt and blameworthiness and the personal characteristics of the
offender. In interview, the public prosecutor stressed that the
prosecution service takes a different view on the usefulness of the
prosecution than that of the administrative agency: blameworthiness
and guilt and personal characteristics are important. 104
In the Netherlands, until 2007, where there was a violation of
the Prijzenwet or the Colportagewet the FIOD-ECD could refer the
case to the Public Prosecutor who might bring proceedings before the
criminal court.' 05 In Dutch criminal law "intent" (opzet) needs to be
proved, but not malicious intent (boos opzet); so-called "colourless
100 Id.
1l0 DGEM Interview, supra note 38.
102 Prosecutor Interview, supra note 38.
103 Id.
104 id.
105 MEA Interview, supra note 46
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intent" (kleurloos opzet) is sufficient. After the implementation of the
2007 reforms, the Prijzenwet and Colportagewet are only enforced
administratively. 106 Nevertheless, the general provisions in the Dutch
Criminal Code regarding deception and fraud remain in force.'
0 7
When both the public prosecutor and the CA have legislative
authority to deal with a case, the CA is only allowed to act if the
public prosecutor decides not to prosecute or fails to take any action.
Interviewees from the Consumentenbond and the Ministry of
Economic Affairs confirmed that enforcement of consumer
protection provisions did not seem to be a major concern of the
FIOD-ECD and the public prosecutor. '
0 8
In the United Kingdom, criminal prosecutions, initiated by the
TSS, are either to the magistrates court, for less serious cases, or to
the Crown Court, for more serious cases. If the former, the
prosecution is undertaken by the TSS itself, the case is tried
summarily and there is a maximum fine which may be imposed. 10 9
For prosecutions in the Crown Court, the case must be referred to the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the CPS forms its own
judgment on whether it is appropriate for the prosecution to proceed.
In the Crown Court the trial is by indictment and if there is a
maximum amount which may be imposed by way of fine, it is
significantly higher than that in the magistrates court; imprisonment
is also available as a penalty. "1
0
To secure a conviction the prosecutor must satisfy the
criminal law burden of proof of "beyond all reasonable doubt.""
1 I
However, there is invariably available the defense of "due diligence",
enabling the defendant to prove that commission of the offense was
due to a mistake, reliance on information supplied, the act or default
of another, an accident, or some other cause beyond the defendant's
control and that all reasonable precautions were taken and all due
diligence exercised to avoid the commission. "1
2
106 See infra pp. 124-25.
107 Wetboek van Strafrecht, Articles 326 and 329.
108 MEA Interview, supra note 46; NCA Interview, supra note 46.
'09 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
"10 Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s. 18.
1 " See Michael Jefferson, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 2007).
112 Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s.24.
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Although prosecutions are considered to be processes of "last
resort," the number undertaken is by no means trivial. For the period
of five years to 2004, there were 3,929 prosecutions brought under
the Trade Descriptions Act by the TSS.113 Data was not made
available to us on the number of complaints and investigations from
which the figure was derived but, in 2004-2005, having regard to all
the enforcement responsibilities of TSS, there were in Britain
597,995 "enforcement activities," 36,387 "letters of informal caution
and advice," 2,385 "formal cautions" and 4,609 prosecutions
commenced." 4
In sum, in all four of the countries there is a recognition that
the criminal law should continue to play a role in relation to the
enforcement of consumer protection legislation, notably where
alternative systems are likely to provide inadequate deterrence. At the
same time it is acknowledged, particularly in Australia and Belgium,
that the criminal law may not always be an appropriate mechanism to
respond to breaches of consumer protection law. This might be
because resources within the criminal prosecution service become too
stretched, with consumer protection being accorded insufficient
priority. Or it might be because officers within the criminal
prosecution service tend to adopt a perspective on the goals of
consumer protection enforcement different from those of the
enforcement agency, and this is considered inappropriate except for
the minority who constitute rogue traders."
Civil Procedures
We should note, first, the distinction between the use of the
civil law by administrative authorities to enforce consumer protection
regulation (which is not common to all legal systems examined) and
its use by consumers enforcing private rights against the trader
(which. is far more common).
In Australia, civil remedies for breaches of consumer
protection provisions (Part V TPA) include declarations that the TPA
has been contravened, injunctions, community service orders and
probation orders, compensation and corrective advertising" 5 .
Adverse publicity orders are also available but can only be made if a
113 Taken from Chartered Institute of Public Finance compiled data 2005,
made available to authors by the DTI.
114 Id.
115 See Trade Practices Act, supra note 29, sections 80, 82, 86(C), 86(D) and
2008] 389
Loyola Consumer Law Review
criminal penalty has already been imposed. 116 Cease trading orders or
the suspension of a business license are not available to the ACCC. 7
For most traders, the harm suffered to their market reputation from
the publicity consequent on an adverse court judgment is a sufficient
deterrent against future breaches of the law." 8
One particularly interesting civil remedy available to the
ACCC is the "probation order".1 9 This is an order to (a) establish a
compliance program, (b) establish an education and training program,
or (c) direct a person to revise the internal operations of his/her
business. 120 Compliance programs provide a preventative mechanism
enabling companies to identify, remedy and reduce the risk of
subsequent trade practices breaches. Therefore, the ACCC is also
concerned with compliance program clauses when seeking court
orders or settling a matter by a court-enforceable undertaking.'
12
Typically, a company is required to design, implement and maintain a
compliance program for three years following the conclusion of a
case. 122 The ACCC has a dedicated team that monitors compliance
with court orders and compliance program. 123 Breach of a probation
order can eventually be treated as a contempt of court, leading to
imprisonment or a very hefty fine. 124 Probation orders have recently
been frequently used and are considered as a cost-effective way of
avoiding further (inadvertent) breaches of the law. 125 In certain
circumstances the ACCC targets education and compliance
campaigns at specific industry sectors where it appears that there may
be a systematic market failure or general compliance issues. 126
116 Id. at section 89(D).
117 ATC Interview, supra note 32; ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
118 Id
119 Trade Practices Act, supra note 29, section 86(C)(II)(b).
120 Id. at section 86(C).
121 ATC Interview, supra note 32; ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
122 id.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 id.
126 ATC Interview, supra note 32; ACCC Interview, supra note 32.
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Private parties can themselves bring civil actions for breaches
of Part V of the TPA.127 Findings of fact made against a respondent
in earlier proceedings for an offense (against Part VC of the TPA)
will be prima facie evidence of those facts in later proceedings by.. 128
affected persons for damages or compensation. Although this
facilitates the obtaining of compensation for consumers, it is unclear
whether it also has an effect on compliance by traders.
In Belgium, non-compliance with a warning can lead to civil
proceedings at the commercial court for an order for cessation of the
offense 29 , with the threat of penalty payments for each day, week or
month of continued violation of the order. A cessation order can be
sought by: a party with standing e.g. a competitor harmed by the
violation; an association for consumer protection that meets a number
of special conditions (these actions are, however, rare in practice); or
the Minister for the Economy.' 
30
It follows that if DGEM wishes to seek an enforcement order,
they can currently do so only through the Minister and that helps to
explain why this option is seldom used. 13 There may be political
reasons why the Minister does not wish to take action; in addition it
is costly, requiring an attorney at law to be employed. However, as a
result of the implementation of European regulation 2006/2004 on
Consumer Protection Co-operation, the director-general of DGEM
now also has acquired the right to bring an action, independently of
the Minister. 132
The consumer-victim has the following options: to make a
complaint to the DGEM; to make a complaint to the police (rarely
used); to pursue a claim in the commercial court for a cessation order,
if the wrong is continuing; to pursue a claim in the civil court for
damages, if loss has been sustained: or alternatively to add that claim
127 According to the Trade Practices Act Section 87(C)(a), the ACCC may
intervene in such private proceedings.
128 Trade Practices Act, supra note 29, section 83.
129 Fair Trade Practices Act, Art.101. Article 101 of the Fair Trade Practices
Act provides that when a warning has not been complied with, the Minister can
launch an action in cessation of the wrongful behaviour. A request in that respect
has to be made to the Commercial Court.
130 This follows from Article 101 of the Fair Trade Practices Act.
131 DGEM Interview, supra note 46.
132 The Act of 11 May 2007 changed Article 98 of the Fair Trade Practices Act
so that also the Director of DGEM can now file the claim.
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to a criminal prosecution as "partie civile". 133 As a result of a recent
legislative change (Act of 5 June 2007) which implemented European
directive 2005/29 of 11 May 2005 in Belgian law the consumer also
has the possibility to ask for reimbursement of the purchase price
when a product or service has been delivered in violation of statutory
provisions. 134 The judge moreover has the possibility of ordering
reimbursement without the consumer being required to return the
delivered product or service. 35
In the Netherlands, a consumer detecting or suspecting a
contravention can, among other possibilities, take the case to one of
the many ADR committees (this is the easiest and least costly option,
but is available only if the trader is associated with the relevant
branch organization), or make a complaint to one of the consumer
organisations, for example, the Stichting Ombudsman or the
Consumentenbond, leading to possible negotiations with, or civil
proceedings against, the trader.
1 
_T6
ADR committees' 37 function effectively as arbitration boards.
If a trader who is suspected of a contravention is affiliated to one
such committee, the case can be brought before it. Affiliation to an
ADR committee is usually done on a voluntary basis, but it provides
a way for traders to indicate their reliability and some consumers, in
133 According to Article 4 of the title preceding the Belgian Code of Criminal
Procedure of 27 November 1808 the victim can bring his civil claim before the
same court as the criminal prosecution.
134 Act of 5 June 2007, Moniteur Belge, 21st June 2007 which modified the
Fair Trade Practices Act of 14 July 1991 (in Dutch: Wet betreffende de
handelspraktijken en de voorlichting en bescherming van de consument).
135 For comments see H. de Bauw, 'De impact van de richtlijn oneerlijke
handelspraktijken op de regeling van de verkooppromoties onder de WHPC', Droit
de la consommation, nr. 72, 2006, 3-30 and X 'Omzetting van de richtlijn
oneerlijke handelspraktijken', Droit de la consommation, nr. 74, 2007, 107-112 as
well as B. Ponet, 'Wet oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegen consument: door de
letter?', Balans, 31 augustus 2007, 569.
136 NCA Interview, supra note 55.
137 For our three example contraventions, these would include the
Geschillencommissie Voertuigen (vehicles ADR committee) which dealt with 747
cases in 2005, leading to an average compensation of E4,066 and the
Geschillencommissie Thuiswinkel (home shopping ADR committee), which dealt
with 120 cases in 2005, leading to an average compensation of C608.80: Stichting
Geschillencommissies voor Consumentenzaken, Jaarverslag 2005 (2006), pp. 108-
111 and 101-102, respectively. There is also the Reclame Code Commissie
(Advertising Code Committee) which operates independently of the SGC.
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their purchasing policy, may distinguish between affiliated and non-
affiliated traders. 
38
A small fee (for example between E30 and C50) is typically
charged to consumers using the process, and cases are expedited
relatively speedily. 139 On the other hand, not every sector is covered
by a committee and decisions are not binding. The ADR committees
are considered as a low-threshold type of self-regulation which
functions well, leading to a relatively high level of compliance by
affiliated traders. 140  However, quite apart from the obvious
limitations, that some sectors are not covered and decisions are not
binding, the interviewees recognized that the process did not deal
adequately with cases where: the trader's activities generate
widespread losses, rather than damage to particular individuals;
urgent action is needed e.g. to stop continuation of a certain harm; or
damage is caused by a non-affiliated trader. 
141
A consumer who refers a complaint to the Consumentenbond
can receive some limited legal advice for E10 (free for members). 1
42
Prior to 2000, the Consumentenbond used to take on civil cases for
individual members through their legal service. 143 However, this
proved to be too expensive and it now intervenes usually only in
cases of collective action, involving many claims. 144 Individual
actions are paid for by the consumers themselves. 145
A collective action case is dealt with as follows. The
Consumentenbond normally tries to negotiate with the trader to cease
the contravening activities.146 If this does not lead to a settlement, a
case may eventually go to court. 14 7 Then there are two principal
138 MEA Interview, supra note 46; NCA Interview, supra note 46.
139 The average time for expediting a case is 5 months, although the SGC has a
target of 3 months: Stichting Geschillencommissies voor Consumentenzaken,
Jaarverslag 2005 (2006), p. 6.
140 MEA Interview, supra note 46; NCA Interview, supra note 46.
141 id.
142 NCA Interview, supra note 46.
143 Id.
144 These cases are usually "large-scaled" and attract quite a lot of media
attention. Examples are West-Friese Flora, Dexia and Keukengilde.
145 NCA Interview, supra note 46.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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possibilities. First, a formal collective action whereby the
Consumentenbond acting as an NGO in the public interest seeks an
injunction.148 The judge can order the latter, with the threat of a
penalty payment being imposed in the event of non-compliance.
149
Second, a class action on behalf of many consumers is possible. This
is not a formal collective action, but a group action where several
individual consumers with a similar interest combine their claim,
assisted by the Consumentenbond. In this case, the Consumentenbond
will normally ask the court to establish the trader's liability.
However, a second procedure is still needed to establish the amount
of the damages for each individual consumer and the costs of this
second action must be borne by the consumers themselves. 1
50
In the United Kingdom, the "last resort" option of the OFT is
an enforcement order, made under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002
(this process is also available to the TSS).15 1 An application for an
enforcement order is normally made only where the attempt to
achieve a resolution through a voluntary undertaking by the trader
has failed, the exception being where urgent action is needed to
safeguard consumers' interests. 152 To obtain the order, the
enforcement authority need only satisfy the civil burden of proof that
a contravention has taken place, even though the contravention also
gives rise to criminal liability. 1
53
Breach of an enforcement order may lead to proceedings for
contempt of court, with a fine or imprisonment then being available
for non-compliance, but no penalty attaches to the order itself. 15 4 In
the opinion of officials interviewed, this situation undermines its
capacity to deter. 155 There are no powers to award compensation to
consumer victims, but defendants subject to an order can be made to
148 Id.
149 id.
150 Id.
151 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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pay costs. 156 Although the OFT has powers to publicize the details of
undertakings and enforcement orders, it does so only rarely. 
157
The victims of consumer protection contraventions normally
have private rights in civil law but these must be enforced on their
own initiative. Although these rights may be pursued at relatively low
cost through the small claims procedures, the numbers enforcing their
rights are likely to be small.
Summarizing, there are some clear differences with respect to
the right of administrative agencies to enforce consumer legislation in
a civil justice court. This system plays a most prominent role in
Australia and is (although technically possible) rarely used in
Belgium. In some cases the legal qualification of the remedy can
differ. For example, the enforcement order imposed by the OFT in
the United Kingdom is an administrative sanction rather than a civil
remedy, and penalties imposed by the new consumer authority in the
Netherlands (CA) will be subject to an appeal to the Civil Court of
Rotterdam. This shows that, in some cases, there are thin lines
between the different approaches. Typically the goal of the civil
proceedings is different from that of the criminal process: while the
criminal process aims at particularly rogue traders who cannot be
deterred through alternative means, the civil proceedings are mostly
used to prevent the continuance of the unlawful activity in the
individual case.
As far as the enforcement of private rights is concerned, all
systems have some possibility for individual consumers to seek relief
and obtain compensation for the financial losses suffered. Differences
are strongly related to the particular institutional features of the legal
system concerned. For example, in Belgium, victims can either claim
for a cessation order (in the event of a continuing wrong) from the
commercial court or (in the few cases) where criminal proceedings
are brought victims can constitute themselves "partie civil" in the
criminal court. The most elaborate system of consumer complaints,
aiming both at prevention of further harm and at compensation, can
of course be found in the Netherlands. The ADR-system provided
through the "Geschillencommissies" seems to offer a low threshold
and cost-effective system for many consumer complaints.
156 Id.
157 An enforcement order may require the trader to publish the order (together
with a correcting statement), but this is mainly to deal with misleading statements
and advertisements and is not intended as a "name and shame" sanction.
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Penalties
Penalties may be imposed by means of the administrative,
civil or criminal law, but the powers and practice vary significantly
between jurisdictions.
In Australia, as we have seen, civil remedies include
injunctions, community service orders or the probation order. This
obliges trading firms to adapt their management structures to
regulatory requirements by means of compliance and trading
programs and is considered to be an attractive option by interviewees
in other jurisdictions. Fines can only be imposed in the criminal
process, not in civil proceedings, although this is currently the subject
of review.' 58 Adverse publicity orders are also possible (after
criminal conviction) and some jurisdictions have "name and shame"
procedures and the power to seek "cease trading" injunctions.
In Belgium, in civil proceedings, the commercial court can
order the cessation of the offense with the threat of penalty payments,
but it is rarely sought by consumers. In the criminal law fines are
possible. 159 For the three consumer protection cases which are the
focus of our study, imprisonment is not possible; the Fair Trade
Practices Act provides that this penalty is available only in
exceptional cases.160
The standard reaction to violations of consumer protection
law are the "transactions" proposed administratively. 161 As it appears
from the table below, the average amount imposed has been less than
500 Euro. 1
62
158 Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs, Civil penalties for Australia's
consumer protection provisions, Discussion Paper, September 2005. See also the
accompanying website, which includes many public submissions available at
http://www.consumer.gov.au/html/civilpenalties/index.html.
159 The sanctions (fines) are provided for in Articles 102-104 of the Fair Trade
Practices Act.
160 Article 105 of the Fair Trade Practices Act only allows for imprisonment
where a seller wrongly suggest a humanitarian cause of action which would
promote generosity of consumers.
161 Article 116 Fair Trade Practices Act, supra note 54.
162 These numbers follow from the yearly reports published by DGEM and
have been incorporated into one table here.
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Table 8: Numbers and amounts of "Transactions" 2002-2004
Year Number of Number of Total amount Average amount
transactions transactions paid paid (E) paid (E)
2002 1,509 834 404,950 485.55
2003 1,345 1,081 522,045 482.93
2004 1,220 766163 303,470 396.17
In the Netherlands, public penalties are rarely imposed, given
the focus on ADR. 164 Through civil proceedings an injunction can be
sought with a penalty payment in case of non compliance as well as
compensation for the damage suffered by the consumer. 165 Under the
new arrangements the principal sanction is an administrative fine
with a maximum of E 67,000, as stated above. However, considering
the very recent introduction of this sanction, it is too early to tell how
often such a fine will be imposed. Criminal sanctions will continue to
apply in exceptional cases only.
The UK system, pending the envisaged radical reform, still
relies strongly on criminal prosecutions. The principal penalty
imposed by the courts on conviction is a fine. In 2004-2005, there
were 275 convictions of offenses under section 1 of the Trade
Descriptions Act (false description of goods), for which an aggregate
166of £185,561 was paid in fines' , thus an average amount of about
£675 for each offense. Officials who were interviewed considered
that such amounts were inadequate for deterrence purposes. 167
Several other sanctions are available. The courts have power
to award compensation to victims of the offense and following the
reported 275 convictions in 2004-2005, an aggregate of £53,088 was
awarded for this purpose.' 68 Seven of the defendants convicted
received sentences of imprisonment.16 9 The courts routinely order
convicted defendants to pay part of the prosecution costs and the
163 This relatively low amount is explained by the fact that a number of the
payments would have been made in 2005, for which data was not yet available.
'64 MEA Interview, supra note 46; NCA Interview, supra note 46.
165 id.
166 Office of Fair Trading Annual Report 2004-05, Annexe D.
167 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
168 Taken from Chartered Institute of Public Finance compiled data 2005, made
available by the DTI.
169 Id.
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amount in question can sometimes exceed the fine imposed. 70 In
addition, many TSS departments publicize on their website or
elsewhere the names and details of offenders and the conviction. 
171
An idea of how these sanctions are combined in typical cases
may be derived from Table 9 which gives details of individual cases
of convictions of traders under the Trade Descriptions Act for
interference with odometers, taken randomly from the websites of
TSS departments. 172
Table 9. Criminal Fines for Interference with Odometers
Fine Costs Compensation Publicity
Birmingham £4500 £ 1500 -/
Brent £4500 (4) £ 12000 -
Coventry £600 £200 £660
Derbyshire £600 (3) £740 -/
N.Yorkshire £ 1500 £1000 -_ _ _
Worcestershire £ 1400 £942 £ 100 '
Note: The figure in brackets after the fine indicates multiple offenses.
This brief overview shows that the principal sanction is the
fine (or a related financial penalty). Imprisonment plays a (slightly)
more important role in the United Kingdom than in systems which
rely more on civil (Australia, the Netherlands) or administrative
(Belgium) remedies. Naming and shaming is considered to be more
effective in some jurisdictions (notably Australia) than in others
(notably Belgium), thus suggesting that cultural factors may impinge
significantly on this policy option. In addition some penalties also
aim at preventing further harm such as injunctions, cessation orders,
or orders to cease the infringement. The Australian probation order is
in that respect an attractive remedy aiming at effective compliance by
the violating trader.
4. Policy Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a survey of approaches to
sanctions and enforcement in OECD countries and a more detailed
investigation of the systems in a few countries. Of course, care
should be exercised before drawing any strong policy conclusions on
170 TSA Interview, supra note 48; LACORS Interview, supra note 48; OFT
Interview, supra note 48.
171 id.
172 Information available at http://www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/.
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the basis of such a limited study. Nevertheless, on the basis of the
comparative study of four countries, we are able to reach some
tentative conclusions on some of the aspects of enforcement practice
which we examined.
First, there is the question whether there should be a proactive
approach to the monitoring of traders (as in Australia, Belgium and
the United Kingdom) or whether institutions should adopt a more
reactive approach (as in the Netherlands). A reactive approach is
plausible only in countries where there is a strong culture of
consumer activism. This is likely to be the case where consumer
associations and the like, whether voluntary or publicly funded, and
ADR committees, have a major profile in the sense both that
consumers will be sufficiently aware of their existence in order to
refer cases to them, and that the institutions themselves take the
initiative in publicizing potential problems and seeking out defaulting
traders. In the Netherlands that seems effectively to be the case.
However, the Dutch reactive approach may not work where
consumers do not know their rights or where violations can simply
not be discovered by consumers. In those cases proactive monitoring
by competent administrative agencies is necessary to remedy the
failure of the private law. For the purpose of monitoring, the
experience in the United Kingdom in adopting risk assessment
models reveals the advantage of targeted enforcement efforts.
However, the Australian and Belgian practice showed that sensible
targeting can also exist without the use of a formal model of risk-
assessment. Nevertheless it is important that such targeting should be
based on objective criteria (for example, the number of complaints
relating to particular categories of traders), rather than subjective
criteria, since the latter may too easily permit the intrusion of political
and other undesirable considerations into the appraisal.
Post-detection discretion, allowing the enforcement agencies
to treat suspected offenders differently, is important in all the systems
and is justified by the fact that imposing penalties for first and
particularly minor contraventions can lead to disproportionate costs.
Indeed dismissing such a case (with or without a warning) might
have the benefit of educating traders and thus indirectly improving
future compliance by first-time offenders.
There seems to be a tendency towards an increasing use of
administrative financial penalties. In Belgium this is the standard
reaction; the Netherlands have recently introduced the possibility;
and in the United Kingdom a similar model is supported by recent
policy reviews and is likely to result from the impending legislative
reforms. Looking at the experience in Belgium, an important reason
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for the introduction of the transaction was the problem of resources
available for the criminal prosecution of consumer protection
offenses. There are large savings in costs since, as is revealed in table
8, compliance with the transaction is also relatively high, involving
some 60-70 % of transactions proposed.
Interviewees at DGEM considered that the transaction
provided them with an easy and low-cost possibility of reacting in an
effective manner to offenses. This was partly because, to allow for
appropriate differentiation, the amount to be paid could reflect
elements such as the seriousness of the offense and the profit made
by the trade. The amounts were not significantly smaller than the
fines which would have been imposed by the criminal courts: as such
they were effective deterrents, at substantially lower cost.
These arguments seem rather convincing. The criminal law
can then be reserved for repeat offenders who cannot be deterred by
other instruments, as well as for those whose conduct is regarded as
so repugnant morally as to justify such proceedings being taken,
irrespective of deterrence considerations.
As far as the sanctions are concerned, the imposition of a
financial penalty (either through criminal or through civil
proceedings) determined by reference to the nature of the
contravention and the trader's circumstances is likely to be cost
effective in inducing compliance in many cases. However, more
particularly in cases where for deterrence purposes the financial
penalty is insufficiently large, we notice that most legal systems
possess additional sanctions like compensation orders and "naming
and shaming". Also the Australian "probation order" can in particular
cases be an effective instrument to induce compliance.
There is today still a wide variety of different approaches to
the enforcement of consumer protection legislation. In some
jurisdictions there is almost no administrative intervention but
reliance predominantly on consumer initiative and alternative dispute
resolution (the Netherlands); some confer penalty-imposing powers
on administrative agencies (Belgium); and others largely depend
upon either civil justice (Australia) or criminal justice proceedings
for the infliction of significant sanctions (United Kingdom). It would
be rash to assume that these differences have arisen haphazardly.
They must, to some extent at least, reflect varying circumstances and,
in particular, different legal traditions and cultures. Civil remedies
and ADR may for example work well in a country like the
Netherlands with a long tradition of consumer activism, but may be
less effective in other legal systems. Also the effectiveness of
"naming and shaming" as a penalty may be culturally limited. If that
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is the case, it is highly unlikely that any single model of practices and
procedures will provide the most cost-effective means of achieving a
high degree of compliance with the law across the OECD countries.
